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Recent scholarship on the history of blasphemy in the Christian idiom has been
driven mainly by two preoccupations. One, the battles between heterodoxy and
magistracy for jurisdiction to prescribe the socio-legal standing of beliefs and
non-beliefs; and two, the nature and signiﬁcance of religiously offensive
utterances. The books under review here tackle these inter-related matters via
varied methodologies and historical foci. The range of approaches, as well as
the strengths and weaknesses of each study, are symptomatic of the difﬁculties
of conceptualizing and contextualizing historical blasphemies; an endeavour
made all the more complicated by recent controversies.
I
David Nash’s monograph focuses on the praxis of blasphemy, deﬁned as ‘the
attacking, wounding, and damaging of religious belief’ (p. ), and its effect on
the relationship between community and criminal law. An emphasis on the ways
in which blasphemers were pitched against the will of the state seeks to highlight
the changing legal responses to blasphemy in Christian countries from the
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sixteenth century to the present. Chapter  provides a survey of the most recent
blasphemy controversies, within and without Christianity. The next two chapters
present a chronological survey of blasphemy in words and pictures from 
to . Four chapters follow concerning the identity of blasphemers,
controlling the profane, responses to blasphemy, and blasphemy in ﬁlm.
It is argued that many early modern Christian societies had little need to
contest the function of blasphemy because religious and secular institutions of
the day had a mutual interest in trying to maintain religious uniformity. A host
of criminal convictions in various jurisdictions across Europe paid testament to
the historical reality that ‘theologians and lawyers were increasingly convinced
that the crime [of blasphemy] harmed the community at large’ (p. ). Victims
would, therefore, ‘remain “passive” in the knowledge that religious or secular
authority would take action to restore order and tranquillity’ (p. ).
‘Blasphemers were not punished because they offended God and order, but
instead, so that God and order be not offended’ (p. ). The politics of
community cohesion meant that blasphemers were rarely distinguishable from
archetypes of wayward people: either young, disadvantaged males who railed
against the world, or calculating religious radicals that espoused anticlerical
heresies. Such views reﬂected a contemporary conviction in the interconnect-
edness of moral, religious, and political deviance. A ‘partnership between
community and authority’ helped ensure that ‘shame and contrition loomed
large in the punishments exacted [for blasphemy] throughout the early
modern world’ (p. ). Many jurisdictions maintained substantial, often
physical, punishments for blasphemy well into the eighteenth century, and legal
responses to blasphemy continued to be ‘part of the deeper debate about the
link between church and state’ (p. ).
The French Revolution marked something of a turning point. Thereafter, a
more secular, tolerant society increasingly put an onus on the supposed victim
of blasphemy to argue a case for censure. With a greater willingness to
distinguish between the manner and the matter of religious offence, those who
felt aggrieved now had to be ‘active’ in prosecuting what they believed to be
blasphemy (p. ). Yet, the potential for blasphemy to be seen as an act of
sedition meant that anti-blasphemy legislation could also be ‘a tool of regimes
seeking to re-establish credibility’ (p. ). In Britain, the trial of William Hone
‘indicated how arbitrary the decision to prosecute could be in practice’
(p. ). The inﬂuential case of G. W. Foote forced a legal acceptance that
‘Christianity could no longer be considered “part and parcel” of the law of the
land’ and, instead, an intention to offend should be the principal criterion of
blasphemy (pp. –). The issues involved in these two cases went on to be
formative in the development of blasphemy law in North America and Australia.
In the twentieth century, ﬁlm and television helped popularize the idea that
Christ might have been a mere mortal, challenging society to secularize its
history, its morals, and its sensibilities (pp. –). Moreover, late twentieth-
century artistic expression demonstrated that author intention was both less
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deﬁnable and less signiﬁcant than ﬁrst thought: ‘those who sought offence
could always ﬁnd it’ (p. ). Subsequently, the legal credibility of blasphemy
waned: ‘even Italy, with a more thriving culture of blasphemy law, dismissed
objections to [Martin] Scorsese’s The Last Temptation of Christ because no
evidence existed of malicious intent in making or releasing the ﬁlm’ (p. ).
An increasingly contested sense of blasphemy emerged between secular liberals
and those of conservative faith: the former viewed blasphemy as ‘anachronistic,
oppressive, and inhumane’ and the latter asserted that ‘human-rights agendas
were themselves not actually neutral but actively hostile and secular’ (p. ).
Recourse to the historic relationship between church and state appeared to
provide the offended with hope of legal succour (p. ) and, whilst not
obliging such peoples through direct legislation, modern law sought new ways
to ‘mobilize the community to provide inclusive comfort to the temporarily
oppressed’ (p. ).
Given that this book is an addition to Blasphemy in modern Britain: 
to the present (), the results are disappointing. The distinction between
‘passive’ and ‘active’ responses to blasphemy provides an interesting way
of approaching issues of paradigmatic-cum-cultural orthodoxy and
heterodoxy; but it may be suggested that a rather undiscerning transnational
survey of legal cases over some  years is not necessarily the most effective way
of investigating such matters. The exposition of some nineteenth- and
twentieth-century cases and the analysis of blasphemy in ﬁlm are clear strengths.
It would appear, however, that the book’s aim, to set forth a historical context to
current blasphemy controversies (p. ), is somewhat at odds with producing
a methodologically sound and intellectually rigorous study of blasphemy
over the longue durée. The notion of the past invading the present (p. ) is
melodramatic and risks overlooking complex processes of historical continuity
and change. There is surely a distinction between attacks on belief and attacks
on state-sponsored dogmatic religion; the latter, not the former, appears to
be the dominant topic of this study. Vague references to the Foucauldian
‘gaze’ (passim) appear without clear methodological grounding and, as
such, seem largely unhelpful. By not adequately setting out and justifying the
scope and method of his study, Nash opens his book to a range of further
criticisms.
The title is not an accurate reﬂection of the contents which, almost
exclusively, concern the Western experience in socio-legal settings from the
sixteenth century onwards. Even the image on the dust-jacket, ‘The Devil as
an angel of light’ (from the Truthseeker, c. ), offers false hope; for whilst
St Paul likened false apostles to ‘Satan himself transformed into an angel of
light’ ( Cor. :–), inaugurating a common trope in Christian polemical
theology, this issue is not addressed in the book. Despite an emphasis on
the criminal aspect of blasphemy, there is not an adequate discussion of
either Mosaic Law or medieval Canon Law, both of which are crucial to
understanding how secular authorities came to have jurisdiction over
R E V I E W A R T I C L E
blasphemy cases. Most of the book is based on secondary sources and it would
seem as if preparatory reading, especially with regards to the early modern
period, was dangerously thin. The coverage of seventeenth-century England,
which is quite substantial relative to the length of the book, overlooks more than
half a dozen seminal works. Also, more could have been done to delineate
properly the historical coming together of seditious, blasphemous, and obscene
libel. Beyond English cases, much is made of the trial and execution of the
Dutchman Robert Adriaansz. Van Hoorn in  (pp. –), but the detail
comes via a two-page excerpt from just one secondary source published in .
An  protestation by one American that Jesus Christ was ‘a bastard and his
mother . . . a whore’ (p. ) is discussed with little appreciation that this claim
was an anti-Christian trope with a history dating back at least as far as Celsus
(ﬂ. –). Much of the book covers too many cases in too little detail; and,
the cumulative effect of relatively weak contextualization and regular over-
simpliﬁcation is to undermine the credibility of this history of blasphemy.
Moreover, the suggestion that a ‘conception of community organized for its
own defence against its clearly identiﬁed enemies’ was an intrinsically pre-
modern view (pp. , ), is not particularly convincing as it panders to
rather clichéd historiographical presuppositions about the history of commu-
nity and the individual. As a result, one of the central arguments of the book,
that we are apparently witnessing a return to ‘passive’ responses to blasphemy
(p. ), stands on shaky ground.
 For details, see Richard Helmholz, The spirit of classical canon law (Athens, OH, ),
pp. –.
 These include Christopher Hill, The world turned upside down: radical ideas during the English
Revolution (Harmondsworth, ); Richard Helmholz and Thomas A. Green, eds., Juries, libel,
and justice: the role of English juries in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century trials for libel and slander (Los
Angeles, CA, ); J. C. Davis, Fear, myth and history: the Ranters and the historians (Cambridge,
); Michael Hunter and David Wootton, eds., Atheism from the Reformation to the Enlightenment
(Oxford, ); Roger D. Lund, ed., The margins of orthodoxy: heterodox writing and cultural
response, – (Cambridge, ); John Redwood, Reason, ridicule, and religion: the age of
Enlightenment in England, – (nd edn, London, ); Anne Hughes, Gangraena and
the struggle for the English Revolution (Oxford, ); Kate Peters, Print culture and the early Quakers
(Cambridge, ); and David Loewenstein and JohnMarshall, eds.,Heresy, literature and politics
in early modern English culture (Cambridge, ).
 Important studies include J. R. Spencer, ‘Criminal libel – a skeleton in the cupboard’,
Criminal Law Review,  (), pp. –, –; Philip Hamburger, ‘The development of
the law of seditious libel and the control of the press’, Stanford Law Review,  (), pp. –
; and Philip Harling, ‘The law of libel and the limits of repression, –’, Historical
Journal,  (), pp. –. The articles by Spencer and Hamburger are not cited by Nash.
 Celsus, On the true doctrine: a discourse against the Christians, trans. R. Joseph Hoffmann
(New York, NY, ), p. .
 For challenges to the clichéd view, see Roy Porter, ed., Rewriting the self: histories from the
Renaissance to the present (London, ); Alexandra Shepard and Phil Withington, eds.,
Communities in early modern England: networks, place, rhetoric (Manchester, ); and John
Jeffries Martin, Myths of Renaissance individualism (Basingstoke, ).
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The copy-editing is of a standard not beﬁtting Oxford University Press. The
 Research Assessment Exercise may have forced a rushed publication, but
the quality of ﬁnal typescript is poor. Thomas Woolston died in , not 
(p. ); Robert Darnton’s surname appears as ‘Daunton’ (p. ); there is no
consistency in the spelling of James Nayler’s surname (p. ); the ﬁrst name of
the third earl of Shaftsbury is printed as ‘Authony’ (p. ), and his surname
appears as ‘Ashley-Copper’ (p. ); William Laud was archbishop of
Canterbury during the reign of Charles I, not James I (p. ); Bulstrode
Whitelocke (–) has been confused with Whitelocke Bulstrode (–
), the latter was the true author of The charge to the grand jury (), not
the former (pp. –); the surname of Thomas Aikenhead erroneously
appears as ‘Aitkenhead’ (pp. , , ); references to ‘the Dark Ages’
(p. ) and ‘the Age of Reason’ (p. ) risk giving credence to a distinctly
outmoded historiography; and there are enough anomalies in capitalization to
note. It is regrettable that these errors were not corrected in the paperback
edition (), especially since an addendum to the introduction was inserted
to draw attention to new developments such as the abolition of the common law
crime of blasphemy in England and Wales. Discerning readers will probably
ﬁnd this book thought provoking; but, it should not be considered, as some
reviewers have suggested, a deﬁnitive study.
I I
Michael Graham’s ‘micro-history’ of the life of Thomas Aikenhead, the
Edinburgh student executed for blasphemy in , aims to illuminate the
‘historical relationship between “sin” and “crime”’ (p. ). The legal apparatus of
state is examined at close quarters, particularly with respect to the social,
political, and religious machinations of high ofﬁce in the Scottish capital. Here,
one guiding methodological principle follows Cynthia Herrup’s suggestion that
‘“law is a cultural dialect” and its enforcement “a form of cultural interaction”’
(p. ). The chief objective of the book, however, is to consider the socio-
political context of the Aikenhead case, which Graham claims has been
somewhat neglected in the seminal essay of Michael Hunter, ‘“Aikenhead the
atheist”: the context and consequences of articulate irreligion in the late
seventeenth century’ (p. ). The book is divided into six chapters: the ﬁrst two
consider the politics of religion in the s and the Scottish legislation against
atheism, blasphemy, and profaneness; the third highlights the wider sense of
 The criminal justice and immigration act, , ch. , part v, § : www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga// (accessed  Sept. ).
 Cynthia Herrup, A house in gross disorder: sex, law, and the nd Earl of Castlehaven (Oxford,
), p. .
 Michael Hunter, ‘“Aikenhead the atheist”: the context and consequences of articulate
irreligion in the late seventeenth century’, in Hunter and Wootton, eds., Atheism from the
Reformation to the Enlightenment, pp. –.
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crisis in , the year Aikenhead was charged; the fourth investigates ‘the
making of a blasphemer’; the ﬁfth focuses on the trial and execution; and
the last looks at the aftermath of the whole affair. The main theme, however,
is the ‘drama’ of Aikenhead’s tragedy (p. ).
The main points of the ‘drama’ are relatively straightforward. The politico-
religious anxieties of zealous Presbyterians in the s formed a backdrop to a
heightened desire to legislate against speculative sin. The General Assembly of
the Kirk enacted three distinct laws against profaneness (), blasphemy
(), and atheism (). The key blasphemy law received little scrutiny, due
to the more pressing matter of formulating a response to the Glencoe Massacre,
and was principally a reafﬁrmation of the  statute which retained capital
punishment from the earlier Ordinance.With its wider, vaguer remit and
recourse to execution, the Blasphemy Acts of  and  spearheaded a
campaign against radical heterodoxy. With strong-minded and politically astute
Presbyterians at the heart of government, there was also the political will to
prosecute. This point was demonstrated when a merchant’s book-keeper by the
name of John Fraser was charged with blasphemy in October  (pp. –).
Fraser, who was a relatively wealthy and well-connected individual, openly
avowed to have read the work of heterodox writers such as Charles Blount.
Nonetheless, he was able to craft a coherent defence that not only emphasized
his otherwise unblemished character but also engaged with the nepotism of the
social elites who sat in judgement over him. Fraser escaped with a sentence of
public penitence. The contrast with Aikenhead’s case was stark. Aikenhead had
read heterodox works at college and, under the tutelage of Alexander
Cunningham, he became ‘something of an eclectic visionary with grandiose
ideas that hovered on the frontier between natural philosophy and Renaissance
magic, tipping into fevered imagination’ (p. ). Unlike Fraser, Aikenhead was
ill-equipped to stave off the negative consequences of his idiosyncratic
heterodoxy and was unwittingly primed to be a scapegoat. Aikenhead was ill-
disciplined, impressionable, stubborn, ﬁnancially indebted, and lacked the
right social connections (pp. –, ). Having made enemies of pious students
such as Mungo Craig, he cut an isolated ﬁgure. When Aikenhead was charged
on multiple related counts of cursing, railing, and unbelief, the haphazard
nature of his defence, coupled with the willingness of his enemies to testify
against him, and the lack of sympathy from social elites sealed his fate. The trial
and execution was a performative act which afﬁrmed the power of the state. The
whole affair later became notorious as an example of unnecessary brutality,
incommensurate with the growing appeal of religious toleration.
 It is rarely acknowledged that, on  Jan.  and  Dec. , the House of Lords
considered a Bill for the ‘punishing of Atheism and Blasphemy’ which attempted to reinstate
the death penalty for those who denied or reproached God, or any of the persons of the Trinity.
See the parliamentary archives HL/ PO/ JO/ //, HL/ PO/JO////.
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The portrayal of the socio-political ferment in Edinburgh during the s
enriches our understanding of the Aikenhead case and Graham is to be
commended for engaging with the very human reality of living and dying in
heterodoxy. This book is arguably at heart biographical: Aikenhead the man
stands centre stage. Considering the relationship between the cases of Fraser
and Aikenhead highlights the particularities and peculiarities of the latter, and
this too is most welcome. Yet, the suggestion that this study constitutes a micro-
history that sheds new light on the historical relationship between sin and crime
is somewhat unconvincing. There is little sense of a forensic examination of the
trivial and mundane in order to open up an inner world of hitherto
unacknowledged contemporary presuppositions and beliefs. Consideration of
Aikenhead’s reading habits, for example, remain frustratingly vague and
speculative. Also, the notion that an investigation of an extraordinary event
can somehow inform a historical understanding of a complex, yet quite
ordinary, relationship between sin and crime lacks robust exposition. It has
surely been acknowledged for some time that the ways in which divine law were
perceived, codiﬁed, and implemented were dependent upon criteria such as
human agency and historical contingency; and so Graham’s interpretation does
not really offer anything particularly new here. The appeal to micro-history also
seems implicitly to excuse thicker historiographical contextualization on
important topics such as Scottish politics, radical heterodoxy, scapegoating,
and performative justice. Nevertheless, Graham’s offering, which is well
produced with few noticeable errors, is a lively and informative read.
I I I
The abridged, revised, and translated edition of Francisca Loetz’s Mit Gott
handeln () retains the historiographical focus on the legal aspect of
blasphemy; but, by using speech action theory to investigate deviant religious
utterances, Loetz sets out to establish ‘what made those who cursed God
“blasphemers” and how their norm transgression was dealt with in early modern
Zurich society’ (p. ). Legal cases form the basis of a fascinating reconstruc-
tion of the ‘intersubjective interpretations of reality’ that produced cultural
‘meaning[s]’ of blasphemy (pp. , ). Here, the work of Carolyn Conley,
rather than Cynthia Herrup, shapes Loetz’s critical awareness of the nexus
between law and culture (p. ). Much is made of the interplay between the
non-authoritarian, social (‘horizontal’) forces and the politico-legal (‘vertical’)
forces that formed the contingencies which affected the nature and signiﬁcance
of criminal blasphemy. Valuable theoretical discussions provide initial thrust,
but from then on the study is fuelled by an impressive empirical investigation of
‘some  blasphemers’ gleaned from thousands of pages of primary
documents (p. ). The book is divided into four parts: the ﬁrst tackles
 Carolyn A. Conley, The unwritten law: criminal justice in Victorian Kent (New York, NY, ).
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historiography and methodology; the second considers the offence of
blasphemy with respect to judicial ‘sanctioning’, ‘social action’, and ‘(un)
belief’; the third addresses ‘historical change and confessional comparison’;
and the last offers comments on the ‘cultural history of religiousness’.
It is posited that early modern contemporaries understood blasphemy
primarily as a particular ‘historical categorisation’ of the ‘speech actions of
cursing, swearing, or abusing God, in accordance with early modern
theological-juridical criteria’ (p. ). The central argument of the second and
largest section of the book (which covers  pages) is that contemporary uses
of and responses to blasphemy were part of a complex and largely secular
honour system that dominated society in city-states like Zurich. Blasphemy was
both an ordinary and extraordinary aspect of an ‘honour economy’ that
experienced conﬂict and cohesion through honour-based relationships. The
identiﬁcation and punishment of blasphemy was informed by a three-way
relationship between council, church, and citizen. Consequently, a relatively
integrated, albeit contingent, process brought diverse inﬂexions to bear upon a
relatively standard anti-blasphemy lexicon which had its roots in medieval
ecclesiastic discourse.
Whereas the ‘secular authorities did not need the help of the church in
removing blasphemers from society’, the church ‘had an important role in the
reintegration of blasphemers’ (p. ). Penitential punishments combined with
more secular ‘loss-of-honour’ sanctions to ensure that blasphemy was treated by
formal and informal restorative justice. Citizens who were informants and
witnesses, as well as those who were affected by either the articulation of, or
response to, blasphemies were also crucial to establishing cultural meanings of
blasphemy. ‘At the normative level, blasphemy was a grave offence and
demanded severe punishment. In practice, however, the reactions of witnesses
ranged from exemplary horror and legal action to passive and active toleration
of blasphemies’ (p. ). The blasphemous component of swearing and
cursing was often seen as banal and excusable set against secular concerns
relating to honour conﬂict and social discord; here some parallels may be
drawn with Shelly Burtt’s reading of the English Societies for the Reformation
of Manners in the s. The blasphemous beggar, for example, was
harangued not primarily because of their insults against God, but because
dissolute people were seen as a social nuisance (p. ). A key criterion of
serious blasphemy was whether witnesses perceived the utterance to be
different from standard grumblings, jests, and profane outbursts. ‘Blasphemy
committed in an emotional state was tolerated . . . within limits’ (p. ); but,
‘those who provoked God deliberately and possibly with “original” expressions
committed a far graver offence’ because ‘divine retribution was to be feared’
(p. ). Brazen rebellion against God was rare and typiﬁed by supposed
 Shelley Burtt, ‘The societies for the reformation of manners: between John Locke and the
Devil in Augustan England’, in Lund, ed., The margins of orthodoxy, pp. –.
 H I S TO R I C A L J O U R N A L
speech actions of disobedience, criticism, and mockery, and extended to forms
of ‘pre-modern atheism’ (p. ). Blasphemers moved by doctrinal impulses
were treated with a degree of tolerance given the context of wider discussions
about the inherent ‘paradoxes of Christianity’ (p. ). Judicial activity against
blasphemy in Zurich was concentrated in the years – and –
(p. ) and was not signiﬁcantly affected by the Reformations or other notable
crises. A quick comparison with Catholic Lucerne emphasizes the extent to
which ‘horizontal social control [in Protestant Zurich] showed more intensive
effects than authoritarian repression’ (p. ).
The scale of Loetz’s research is formidable and the nuance of the historical
interpretation that emerges is often distinct and insightful: ‘blasphemers came
from all groups in society’ (p. ), but they tended to be perceived as
outsiders. ‘Not every act of blasphemy was prosecuted as such . . . [for] society
was capable of permitting religious taboo-breaking’ (p. ); ‘false accusations
[of blasphemy] were exceptional, but denunciations could be used to settle a
score with someone’ (p. ); ‘examples from Zurich contradict the idea that
blasphemy can be understood as a sublimated form of violence and thus as part
of the civilisation process’ (p. ); ‘the Zurich Council’s sentencing provides
no evidence of progress towards a more “modern” or “humane” judicial policy’
(p. ), although ‘the image of an intolerant early modern era that waged
relentless war on unorthodox words and deeds is too undifferentiated’ (p. ).
The balance between effective use of theory and empirical investigation is well
struck and the wider implications of Loetz’s results, whilst over-stated in places,
are of great value. When it came to religion, ‘early modern society had far
greater space for thought and action than the authorities allowed, and . . . this is
not merely attributable to a power vacuum . . . [for] Council, church and social
environment all exercised certain tolerance’; and yet, ‘the ﬁght against
blasphemy relied on popular support’ (pp. , ). Here, Loetz’s study
clearly complements Alexandra Walsham’s magisterial Charitable hatred
().
Nevertheless, some of Loetz’s claims are open to challenge. The distinction
between the religious and secular consequences of apparently blasphemous
utterances might at times be too simplistic because of the way in which social
interactions were understood through a Christian paradigm. The legal evidence
perhaps over-emphasizes secular, social discord. Moreover, if the majority of
blasphemous utterances were not actually really that blasphemous then why
continue with the terminology of blasphemy? Loetz does not seem to have an
answer to this conundrum and this is possibly because her study does not
effectively consider the relationship between popular religious discourse, in
general, and discrete legal cases in particular; notwithstanding a brief acknowl-
edgement of the interplay between real and ﬁctional depictions of blasphemous
 Alexandra Walsham, Charitable hatred: tolerance and intolerance in England, –
(Manchester, ).
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incidents (p. ). Indeed, some of Loetz’s interpretations might appear less
secure once read through the more general insights of Ann Hughes’s peerless
Gangraena (). There are also occasions when Loetz’s grasp of
contemporary polemical theology may be questioned. For example, a 
utterance communicating a belief in a fully mortal Jesus is presented as a
‘blasphemous’ speech action which rendered God an ‘ordinary mortal’
(p. ). This seems subtly misleading: surely the rejection of the Christ-
centric, Trinitarian orthodoxy was the crucial issue here? Finally, Loetz’s
concluding appeals to embrace historical ambivalences, surpass historiographi-
cal models associated with the popular–elite dichotomy, and move towards a
cultural history of religiousness all appear rather trite given the historiographi-
cal developments of the last twenty years.
There are some more minor quibbles too. A near constant recourse to
taxonomy as an analytical tool gets a touch wearing and it can sometimes be
difﬁcult to judge the relative legitimacy and value of the numerous categories
presented. Contextualization is, at times, a bit thin with the result that
opportunities are sometimes missed to offer sharper, richer analysis. To
highlight just two areas here: more explicit consideration of the ‘Magisterial
Reformation’ would have helped the reader understand the dynamics that
shaped social cohesion and religious conformity in Zurich; and, reference to
obstinate blasphemy (p. ) and blasphemy as unbelief (pp. –) would
have beneﬁted from a greater awareness of the ideas and rhetorical strategies at
play within contemporary polemical theology. One cannot help but feel that
intellectual contexts are under-played. The quality of the prose is admirable
for a translated work; but, some analytical comments do contain idiosyncratic
shifts between past and present tenses.
Overall, however, Loetz is to be congratulated for a deeply engaging and
sensitive study, which surely constitutes the most signiﬁcant work on early
modern blasphemy from a Protestant, legal-cum-cultural perspective. The
translator and the commissioning editor of the St Andrews Studies in
Reformation History series should be applauded for bringing such an
important work to a new readership.
I V
At about the same time that early evangelicals were grappling with blasphemers
in Zurich, Hernán Cortés and the Inquisition were battling against sins of the
tongue in New Spain. In considering the latter context, Javier Villa-Flores’s work
 Hughes, Gangraena and the struggle for the English Revolution.
 Surprising omissions include Michael Hunter, ‘The problem of “atheism” in early
modern England’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, th ser.,  (), pp. –;
Maureen Flynn, ‘Blasphemy and the play of anger in sixteenth-century Spain’, Past and Present,
 (), pp. –; and John Spurr, ‘A profane history of early modern oaths’, Transactions
of the Royal Historical Society, th ser.,  (), pp. –.
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also draws upon speech action theory. The premise of the study is that
blasphemous speech was ‘a kind of deprecatory language that was not only
aimed at the deities of the Catholic pantheon but also staged for an audience’
(p. ). A wealth of sources from Inquisition cases (approximately  for
blasphemy between  and ) are used in conjunction with confessional
manuals, sermons, and religious treatises to advance an investigation of ‘the
instrumental uses of blasphemy in the interface of class, gender, and race
relations in New Spain’ (p. ). The driving argument is that the articulation of
blasphemy constituted a resistance strategy which gave agents an opportunity to
assert some level of control in an otherwise unfavourable social climate. A brief
introduction is followed by chapters on imperialism, masculinity, gambling,
women, and slaves.
This ‘social history of blasphemy’ complements the work of Alain Cabantous
by serving up novel interpretations of some familiar topics. Soldiers, sailors,
muleteers, and other men who lived hard lives (that is to say those who can so
easily suffer from both contemporary and historiographical cliché) are
considered with respect to gender. Blasphemy, it is argued, was ‘a cultural tool
of gender self-fashioning and masculine assertiveness’ (p. ). More speciﬁ-
cally, blasphemy was part of ‘a cultural script of male risk taking’ and ‘could be
used both as a language of male bonding and as a resource to manifest social
detachment’ (p. ). So, for example, ‘military men boasted of their bravery
through blasphemous remarks’ in an effort to ward against being labelled as
fearful or cowardly (p. ). Moralists responded by describing blasphemers as
‘animalistic, satanic, and effeminate’ in an effort to ‘counteract the idea that
blasphemy asserted “manliness”’ (p. ). Due to the spiritual and temporal
threat to the imperial mission, offenders in the armed forces faced harsh
punishments that ranged from ﬁne and penance to corporal punishment and
banishment. With respect to blasphemies arising from the male preserve of
gambling, responses were more ambivalent. Given a scenario with multiple
potential outcomes, one could legitimately appeal to divine providence for
favourable selection. Whilst gambling was viewed as an illegitimate and
pernicious cause in this regard, the crown held a monopoly over the sale of
playing cards and the sheer prevalence of gambling meant that it was all but
impossible to act as some high-minded moralists would have liked. Losing a
gamble could spark blasphemous utterances that attacked God for His apparent
lack of favour; paradoxically, this was an act premised on belief in the Almighty.
With regards to women, Villa-Flores invokes Robin Lakoff’s Language and
woman’s place () to assert that, ‘when being defamed or unjustly conﬁned,
women resorted to blasphemy in order to make forceful statements to ﬁght
back’; but ‘by subverting the gendered moral expectations that demanded that
pious women demonstrate verbal restraint, they compromised their status as
 Alain Cabantous, Blasphemy: impious speech in the West from the seventeenth to the nineteenth
century, trans. Eric Rauth (New York, NY, ).
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Christian women’ (pp. –). ‘Female blasphemers often felt compelled
to use, and thus conﬁrm, the misogynist stereotypes that depicted them as
weak human beings, incapable of controlling their tongues and passions’
(p. ). Finally, ‘black slaves, the victims of cruelty and mistreatment,
renounced God to provoke the intervention of the Inquisition as a strategy
to gain at least temporary freedom from the brutal working conditions
they endured’ (p. ). Part of this rhetorical ploy was to create a scenario
whereby the cause of blasphemy could be assessed: had the slave master’s
actions induced blasphemy? Some contemporaries certainly thought so
(challenging the notion that intention was a more modern criterion of
blasphemy). Hence, ‘Afro-Mexican’s blaspheming was both a rejection of the
Christian moral order that legitimized slavery and an attempt to claim a
Christian identity in order to survive a violent regime’ (p. ). In summary, the
book demonstrates that repressed or maltreated social groups were sometimes
‘conscious performers of a verbal art associated with discourses of danger, sin,
and salvation’ whereby blasphemy was used less to attack God and more for its
social force, given the contemporary relationship between religion, politics, and
society.
Villa-Flores packs a good punch in this slim volume (the main body of
text is just  pages): the gender arguments work particularly well to
enrich the historiography and, more generally, a range of good examples
build up a convincing picture of how bellicose, irreverent language was used by
various groups in society to resist hostile forces and self-fashion a degree of
control. The interplay between secular and sacred concerns is not lost and the
nature of blasphemy as a sign of belief is worth exploring further. Indeed, there
are times when the study would have beneﬁted from richer contextualization
and deeper analysis. For example, the chapter on gambling lacks a discussion of
how ideas of fate could be perceived as atheistical. On a separate matter, a
decision to standardize biblical quotations via the New International Version
lacks a certain amount of historical sensitivity. Of greater concern, however, is
an apparent lack of conceptual consistency vis-à-vis blasphemy itself. Having
acknowledged that, ‘in a strict sense, it was not in the mouth of the utterer that
blasphemy “originated” but on the lips of the denouncer’ (p. ), it is
problematic to fashion an argument that stresses the immediate function of the
utterance as blasphemy because this is, by deﬁnition, a conceptual impossibility.
Furthermore, at some point one needs to pronounce a conceptual distinction
between irreverent language in general and blasphemous language in
particular, and Villa-Flores does not seem to do this successfully. Villa-Flores’s
use of theory appears sound, but in both preparing the ground and analysing
the sources a slightly fuller discussion would have no doubt helped secure
the central arguments. Nevertheless, this remains an exciting investigation
which will be of signiﬁcance to scholars of both blasphemy and colonial
Christianity.
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VDavid Nash’s four-volume edited collection of primary sources is a worthy
addition to his previous monographs on blasphemy and is clearly at home in
the Pickering & Chatto stable. Whilst not explicitly stated, this work continues
the main thematic, chronological, and geographical emphasis of Blasphemy in
the Christian world, namely the socio-legal sphere in nineteenth-century Britain
and America. The short ﬁrst volume, titled The blasphemous enlightenment to ,
sets the scene by dipping into the anti-blasphemy literature of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The second, much more substantial
volume, The early nineteenth century, focuses on various sources relating to the
blasphemy trials of Richard Carlile and his associates, Abner Kneeland, and
Thomas Paterson. The equally sized third instalment, The late nineteenth century,
presents some signiﬁcant texts by radicals such as George Jacob Holyoake,
Charles Bradlaugh, and George William Foote. The ﬁnal volume, The Edwardian
period and early twentieth century, includes censured works of John William
Gott and Ernest Pack; various articles from the Truthseeker; and ends with a
deputation sent to the British home secretary from the Society for the Abolition
of the Blasphemy Laws (). The ﬁrst volume starts with a general
introduction and the last includes a helpful index. The sources appear in a
new typeset and some longer texts have been abridged. All sources beneﬁt from
editorial headnotes and endnotes.
This collection reinforces the notion that past discussions of blasphemy were
dominated by legal discourse, and it will surely be viewed as a useful resource by
specialist scholars who are able to make the most of the primary sources on
offer. Some of the choicest offerings are as follows. The inclusion of work by
Benjamin Hobhouse is refreshing and challenging (I, pp. –). A source
detailing the books sold by Richard Carlile in his shop on Fleet Street and
another providing a report on the trial of his sister, both offer insights which
thicken our understanding of Carlile’s networks (II, pp. –, –). The
ability to compare and contrast Carlile’s case with that of Abner Kneeland in
Massachusetts is most helpful (II, pp. –). Consideration of Robert
Ingersoll’s lecture, ‘real blasphemy’ (), forces a timely reassessment of the
freethinking maxim, ‘in a world of lies, truth is blasphemy’ (III, pp. –). A
list, produced by the Truthseeker, of those prosecuted for blasphemy in Britain
during the nineteenth century will facilitate further scholarly enquiry (IV,
pp. –).
The general introduction offers a brisk historical overview from ancient to
modern times, but strangely omits to discuss the editorial rationale for the
collection. The implicit case that the sources help us to understand the ways
individuals and states negotiated blasphemy and associated rights and res-
ponsibilities has distinct value. Nevertheless, readers will probably need to be
aware of Nash’s other work to gain an appreciation of why nineteenth-century
Anglo-American blasphemy cases are deemed to be of such historical
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signiﬁcance. Bibliographic notes for the general introduction tend to be
outmoded: a discussion of early English Quakerism, for example, fails to
refer to any work published after  (I, p. xxxiv n. ). It may be posited
that the authority of Nash’s commentary is undermined by a decision to
overlook relevant recent literature. Headnotes tend towards summary and
often shy away from offering important historical and historiographical
context. This is particularly noticeable in the ﬁrst volume. A sermon entitled
The second Spira () is introduced without reference to the Spira legend
(I, pp. –). Hobhouse’s Treatise on heresy () is considered without
reference to either the author’s Anglican background or his ﬂirtation with
Unitarianism. Socinian blasphemy exposed (nd edn, ) is presented as an
anonymous text (I, pp. –); but a small amount of detection work reveals
that the author was probably the evangelical convert and religious
controversialist Sir Richard Hill (–). More generally, there is
limited engagement with the recent historiography of nineteenth-century
radicalism. Endnotes tend to be used for points of clariﬁcation and as such
opportunities are missed to offer details on further reading. The extent to
which the issue of source selection is avoided is also a concern. The guiding
interest here would seem to be the agency of radical individuals and their
quest to have their opinions not only heard but also tolerated by the legal
establishment. If this is the case, then a question mark hangs over the degree
to which this collection actually helps us to understand contemporary
perceptions of and responses to blasphemy on their own terms. More
editorial care and candour would have gone a long way to making this a very
good collection.
 The invocation of the demise of Francis Spira (d. ) forms part of a complex
phenomenon in the history of Christianity. The tale was popularized by, amongst others,
Richard Sault (d. ), whose pamphlet The second Spira was printed in London, England, and
Boston, Massachusetts, well into the late eighteenth century. For further details, see: Michael
MacDonald, ‘The fearefull estate of Francis Spira: narrative, identity, and emotion in early modern
England’, Journal of British History,  (), pp. –; and M. A. Overell, ‘Recantation and
retribution: “remembering Francis Spira”, –’, Studies in Church History,  (), pp.
–.
 The ESTC cites Hill as author of an anonymous pamphlet entitled An important case argued
(th edn, ), which (in Nash, I, p. ) is stated as being written by the same author as
Socinian blasphemy exposed (nd edn, ).
 For an introduction, see William Stafford, ‘Shall we take the linguistic turn? British
radicalism in the era of the French Revolution’ (a review article), Historical Journal,  (),
pp. –.
 A précis of the collection on the publisher’s website states that the ‘sources are
arranged to represent both sides of the debate, giving voice to the accused and the accusor
[sic]’. See www.pickeringchatto.com/major_works/blasphemy_in_britain_and_america_
_ (accessed  Aug. ).
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V I
The historical investigation of blasphemy is particularly taxing and yet the
studies under review here show what can be achieved. There is much that
links the books together; not least the largely consensual view on the secular,
social import of blasphemous utterances and the extent to which blasphemy
legal cases offer a unique perspective on the relationship between authority and
community. Scholars may be close to exhausting the main caches of blasphemy
legal cases and the methodological limitations of legal approaches are now
more apparent. Whilst not wishing to suggest that further investigations in this
area of blasphemy studies are unproﬁtable, for more could be done to
investigate the relationship between sin and crime, scholars should be
encouraged to think harder about how to understand the historical meanings
of blasphemy, both within theological polemic and at the interface between
competing conceptions of the nature and signiﬁcance of the sacred sphere. An
appreciation of theological discourse through the philosophy of language, and
in particular a consideration of so-called ‘thick’ ethical concepts, may advance
an understanding of how the reception of wayward speech informed meanings
of blasphemy. A focus on the ethical dimensions of community may also further
other cultural considerations, as would a greater appreciation of the
relationship between the printed and the oral word. Indeed, the complexities
of understanding past blasphemies should inspire historians to be more
innovative in their investigations of belief, language, and theologico-moral
culture.
DAV ID MANN INGUN IVER S I T Y OF LE ICE STER
 Further important studies hitherto unmentioned include Jane Kamensky, Governing the
tongue: the politics of speech in early New England (Oxford, ); Joss Marsh, Word crimes:
blasphemy, culture, and literature in nineteenth-century England (Chicago, IL, ); Elizabeth
Horodowich, Language and statecraft in early modern Venice (Cambridge, ); and my own
‘Blasphemy in England, c. –’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, ).
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